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Abstract
To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a
more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem,
thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then
use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation be-
haviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males
independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating
behaviour.
JEL Classification: C73, C91, D91.
Keywords: repeated dictator game, altruistic preferences, gender discrimination,
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1. Introduction
Dictator games have been extensively used to study unselfish behaviour both in eco-
nomics and psychology (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). Recently the external
validity of the observations was questioned again; the extent of anonymous altruism
observed in these games seems to be exaggerated and an artefact of experimentation
(Bardsley, 2008) and confounded by experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010, 2013).
Being told in a laboratory experiment that one is allowed and given the opportunity to
share some endowment may induce sharing behaviour that otherwise would not be
observed to the same extend (List, 2007; Winking and Mizer, 2013).
Zizzo (2010) argues that non-deceptive obfuscation is suited for reducing such cog-
nitive experimenter demand effects in the laboratory. In this study we apply this ap-
proach of non-deceptive obfuscation by embedding the dictator game in a more com-
plex decision environment that renders the dictator decision to share some endowment
less salient what should reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect. Indeed,
participants are neither instructed that they will have an opportunity to share some en-
dowment nor that they will be allowed to share some endowment with an anonymous
interaction partner. Instead, we present our experiment participants with a dynamic
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household savings decision problem. The focus of this study is, however, less on the
reduction of cognitive experimenter demand effects but on the investigation of gender
specific allocation behaviour and discrimination.
To learn about intertemporal allocation, and in particular about gender differences
in such problems may be interesting in itself: Switching from unitary to non-unitary
models1 to assess households’ decision making allowed economists to control for fac-
tors such as relative income and age (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Lechene,
1994; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Pollak, 2005). However, not much has been said to
evidence gender differences within such a context. Browning (2000) shed a first light
by introducing life expectancy to motivate further analysis. Indeed, on average, women
live longer than men, and wives are younger than husbands. That said, it is to be ex-
pected that both men and women will have different incentives for saving, generating
gender biases in intra-couple resource allocation choices (Anderson and Baland, 2002;
Commuri and Gentry, 2005). This motivates the design of our experiment.
Here, however, we are mainly interested in the extend of (un)selfish behaviour, its
gender specificity, and gender discrimination. Much experimental research, both from
psychology and economics, was conducted to account for gender differences in terms
of cooperation (Mason, Phillips, and Redington, 1991; Sell, Griffith, and Wilson, 1993;
Simpson, 2003), trust and reciprocity (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Saad and Gill, 2001;
Razzaque, 2009), altruism (Bolton and Katok, 1995; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001)
and corruption (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2011; Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and
Gangadharan, 2009). A variety of games such as the trust, the ultimatum, and the dic-
tator game were used in these studies and showed that gender differences prevail. Yet,
looking at these studies individually no consistent pattern seems to emerge: women
seem neither consistently more nor less socially oriented than men, their social pref-
erences seem rather more context specific (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). While in e.g.
Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman (2004) and Houser and Schunk (2009), two studies ex-
plicitly studying the effect of the receiver’s gender in the dictator game, female subjects
tend to give more to males than females Engel (2011)’s meta study of dictator games
reveals that women tend to give more and tend to receive more (with the dictator gen-
der then being insignificant) than men. However, only 39 out of 131 articles analysed
in Engel (2011) report on the existence or absence of (recipient) gender effects.
Hence, our contribution relies on designing a game that allows studying gender
specific interpersonal allocation behaviour when the gender of the partner is known
without the interpersonal allocation task being salient.
Due to its obvious procedural fairness when being implemented in the form of
random dictators dictatorship is surprisingly often used outside the lab. Empirical ex-
amples of random procedures are lotteries to allocate goods and burdens (see, Elster,
1988). Judges, jurors and soldiers are, for instance, frequently selected by a random
device. By considering a periodic random dictatorship we allow both partners to be
decisive and alter the final outcome by anticipating the allocation choice of their pairs.
By investigating the interpersonal allocation behaviour in a (more natural) context, the
artificiality of the standard dictator game is reduced. This would strengthen the exter-
nal validity of our findings. Accordingly, this article is also a contribution in a novel
context to the literature on gender differences and discrimination in economic decision
making.
1Unitary models refer to models where households maximize a single utility function. Non-unitary mod-
els are those considering as many utility functions as individuals in the household.
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In section 2 we introduce the dynamic decision model with the two players F and
M which is solved for the conditions used in the experiment. The experimental design
is introduced in section 3, the procedures and the sample are discussed in section 4.
After analysing the results in section 5 our main conclusions are finally summarized in
section 6.
2. The Dynamic Allocation Game
For the two players F and M let f , respectively m denote their life expectations
where we assume
f > m > 1, (1)
i.e. F-players live longer. Irrespective of that, M-players also face an intertemporal
allocation problem. Apart from the difference in life expectations we do not impose
any differences. More specifically, both partners evaluate a pattern ζ = (C1, . . . ,CT ) of
consumption values CT in periods t = 1, . . . ,T (≤ f ) according to
ΠF =
f∏
t=1
Ct and ΠM =
m∏
t=1
Ct (2)
with Πi being the monetary earnings (in experimental currency units) of our experiment
participants. Thus, partners would choose the same consumption pattern if they had
identical life expectations and the same (other-regarding) utility function.
To determine ζ we assume that in every period t both partners F and M submit a
proposal stating how much to spend in that period t. After that it is then independently
and randomly decided (with equal probabilities) in each period t = 1 to m which of
the two proposals is implemented, i.e. whether Ct = yt (proposal of the F-player) or
Ct = xt (proposal of the M-player) applies. Of course, consumption patterns ζ are
restricted by the available funds. Let W1(> 0) denote the initial wealth which can be
used for consumption purposes. Since
Wt = Wt−1 −Ct−1 for t ≥ 2, (3)
early consumption restricts later consumption so that
0 ≤ xt ≤ Wt, 0 ≤ yt ≤ Wt and thus 0 ≤ Ct ≤ Wt (4)
must hold for all periods t = 1, 2, . . ..
To derive the optimal behaviour we assume risk neutral players. We assume risk
neutrality since, due to their many “lives” in the experiment, participants should mainly
be motivated by what they earn on average (see also Eichberger, Güth, and Müller,
2003; Rabin, 2000). The constructive proof (see the Appendix) shows that we mainly
rely on dominance arguments in the sense of dominant strategies. As opposed to other
game theoretic contexts, risk neutrality does not have to be commonly known.
We allow, however, for other-regarding preferences in the form of social ties (see,
e.g., van Dijk and van Winden, 1997; van Winden, Stallen, and Ridderinkhof, 2008;
van Winden, 2012) that can be represented by the following utility functions
UF = ΠF × ΠαM and UM = ΠM × ΠαF . (5)
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The parameter α allows for positive or negative weights on the interaction partner’s
earnings in the own utility. For the sake of notational simplicity we omit any indices
for α. Note, however, that α is specific to each decision maker and the interaction
partner.2 Intrinsic altruistic (or spiteful) preferences can be represented by an α > 0
(or < 0) independent of the interaction partner. Directed altruism (see, e.g., Leider,
Möbius, Rosenblat, and Do, 2009), in-group favouritism (Ahmed, 2007; Chen and Li,
2009) and discrimination against members of specific groups (Becker, 1971; Ayres
and Siegelman, 1995; Büsch, Dahl, and Dittrich, 2009) can be represented by αs that
depend on the interaction partner.
For i = F,M a strategy si(·) must assign a proposal (yt, respectively xt) for the
consumption levelCt in period t for all residual wealth levels Wt in t and for all possible
periods t. Optimal choices y?t (Wt) and x
?
t (Wt) will, of course, anticipate rational future
decision making. By applying backward induction one can prove (see the Appendix)
y?t =

(1 + α)Wt
α(m − t + 1) + f − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m
Wt
f − t + 1 =
Wm+1
f − m for m < t ≤ f
(6)
and
x?t =
(1 + α)Wt
α( f − t + 1) + m − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m. (7)
If F does not care about M’s earnings, i.e. if her α = 0, the optimal feasible
consumption proposal y?t ∈ Γt of player F simplifies to
y?t =
Wt
f − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m, (8)
resulting in consumption smoothing over the own remaining time to live. If M’s earn-
ings contribute positively to F’s utility F will make bigger consumption proposals in
the periods t ≤ m
∂y?t
∂α
=
Wt( f − t + 1 − m + t − 1)
(α( f − t + 1) + m − t + 1)2 > 0 for m < f . (9)
In the extreme, F will make consumption proposals that maximize M’s earnings, smooth-
ing the available wealth over M’s remaining time to live
lim
α→∞ y
?
t =
Wt
m − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m. (10)
If M’s earnings contribute negatively to F’s utility F will make smaller consumption
proposals in earlier periods leading to more than own earnings maximizing remaining
wealth in later periods of her life.
In the case that M does not care about F’s earnings, i.e. if his α = 0, the optimal
2In contrast to the above mentioned studies, for our purposes we assume α to be static within one life, i.e.
one instance of the dynamic allocation game. As we will discuss in the section on experimental design each
life be will rather short and the feedback on the partner’s choices will be limited and stochastic, minimizing
the opportunities for updating one’s affective social tie what justifies our assumption.
4
feasible consumption proposal x?t ∈ Γt of player M simplifies to
x?t =
Wt
m − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m, (11)
consumption smoothing over the own remaining time to live. If F’s earnings contribute
positively to M’s utility M will make smaller consumption proposals
∂x?t
∂α
=
Wt(m − t + 1 − f + t − 1)
(α( f − t + 1) + m − t + 1)2 < 0 for m < f . (12)
In the extreme, M will make consumption proposals that maximize F’s earnings, smooth-
ing the available wealth over F’s remaining time to live
lim
α→∞ x
?
t =
Wt
f − t + 1 . (13)
If F’s earnings contribute negatively to M’s utility M will make bigger consumption
proposals in earlier periods leading to less than own earnings maximizing remaining
wealth or even no wealth in later periods of his life.
Therefore, it turns out that optimal, utility maximizing behaviour does not depend
on what the other intends to do: Optimal behaviour requires consumption smoothing
over the remaining (joint) life time.3 Although the decision problem is quite com-
plex, e.g. in the sense of a dynamic game, the optimal behaviour is quite obvious
and prominent. Thus, both players will certainly be close to their optimal conditional
consumption smoothing.
Since the life of the M-player will be shorter we expect the decisions of the M-
player to be most relevant for our analysis. If the M-player opportunistically consumes
the whole residual endowment in the last period of his life the earnings of his F-partner
in this life are then equal to zero. If the M-player leaves some endowment for consump-
tion after his last period he reduces his own earnings but allows the F-player to earn
something as well. Leaving exactly the number of units that the F-player lives longer
will ensure equal earnings for both players in the according life. Thus, behaviour in this
pivotal period of a life can be compared to that in standard dictator games. Whether
the M-player leaves any endowment for his longer living F-partner after his last period
of life may reveal insightful gender differences in our setting.
3. Experimental Design
We run four treatments with identical initial endowments W1 = 21 and life ex-
pectations of m = 4 and f = 6. Consequently, with the assumption of selfish pure
own earnings maximizing behaviour and the expectation to earn zero in about half of
all “lives” the expected earnings of the F-player is still substantially higher than the
expected earnings of the M-player. This should further limit the extent of M-players’
deliberate unselfish behaviour induced by a cognitive experimenter demand effect.
Lastly, the partner’s gender is always known to each participant. In treatment (i)
a male assumes the position of the M-player and a female that of the F-player, and
vice versa in treatment (ii). In treatment (iii) both roles are assumed by females and,
3Due to repeated random dictatorship consumption sequences are stochastic.
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finally, in treatment (iv) both roles are assumed by males. Each subject experiences
only one treatment condition. This 2 × 2 between subjects design (see table 1) allows
to distinguish between discrimination against a gender and gender specific behaviour.
In the experiment a participant experiences ten successive “lives”, always assuming
the same role4 F or M what should provide better chances for learning. The first two
lives are “single lives”, whereas lives three to ten are “couple lives”. The “single lives”
at the beginning of a session make the saving decisions and optimal own earnings
maximising behaviour more salient and easier to learn as there is no stochastic ele-
ment that otherwise would slow down learning (see, e.g., Dittrich, Güth, Kocher, and
Pezanis-Christou, 2012). During “single lives” participants can also get used to choos-
ing rational numbers as the optimal choices during these lives are given by y? = 3.5
and x? = 5.25; consumption choices are only restricted to be non-negative. The soft-
ware used for the experiment provides access to an on-screen calculator what should
reduce any impact of differing cognitive abilities between participants.
In each period within the “couple lives” both players F and M submit simultane-
ously a proposal stating how much to consume in that period of their current “couple
life.” After that it is then randomly decided with equal probabilities which of the two
proposals is implemented for both participants. Participants are then informed only
about the implemented proposal. Hence, a participant is not informed about the part-
ner’s proposal in a period when the partner’s proposal was not implemented.
Within the “couple lives” there is no rematching. The participants are playing eight
lives with the same partner. Thus, “reincarnation” only allows to learn how to “live”
with the same partner and not to diversify by playing differently with different partners.
This repetition should result in a more reliable measure. This is akin to sequences of
mini-dictator game decisions that are, for instance, also elicited for the Ring test of so-
cial value orientation (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988) which enjoys some popularity
in the experimental economics literature (see, e.g., Brosig, 2002; van Dijk, Sonnemans,
and van Winden, 2002; Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, and Shehata, 2009).
If anything, this partners design should be more likely to increase the overall co-
operativeness of M-players for strategic reasons than to decrease it; it reinforces the
influence of reputation and repetition-based reciprocity (Andreoni and Croson, 2008;
Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Nowak, 2006). This strate-
gic incentive works in the opposite direction of our efforts to mitigate a potential cogni-
tive experimenter demand effect. Therefore, if we still observe a decline in the number
of times the M-player leaves some endowment for his partner as compared to a stan-
dard dictator game we can consider this as an indication for an effective reduction in
the cognitive experimenter demand effect.
Payoffs are measured in points, summed up over all rounds, and then transformed
into Euro by 8 points = AC0.01. This ensures average earnings above the hourly wage
of our participants which are usually in the range of AC5 to AC9. In addition to these
earnings participants received a show up fee of AC2.50.
4. Experimental Procedures and Sample
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. Ninetyeight randomly recruited undergrad-
uates from various departments of the Friedrich Schiller university who stated their
4In the experiment the roles were labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’.
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Table 1: Treatments and Number of Couples (Independent Observations)
Life expectation m = 4 f = 6 # Couples
Gender male female 12
male male 13
female female 12
female male 12
Total 49
general willingness to participate in experiments earlier participated in the experiment.
While the gender composition of the various departments can be unbalanced the gen-
der composition of the whole university and therefore of our subject pool is almost
perfectly balanced (approx. 55 % females).
More than half of the subjects (55.8 %) had a partner or was even married (this was
the case for three participants). About half of the participants (49 %) had a background
in economics or business administration. Around one fourth was enrolled at another
humanities department. Further fields of study were e.g. law or computer sciences.
After entering the lab, subjects were seated at computer terminals and received writ-
ten instructions. Questions were answered privately. The experiment was programmed
and performed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The participants were assigned to one
of the two roles (M- or F- player) according to their gender and the assigned treatment.
Each of the four treatments was performed by twelve couples, except for the male-male
treatment, where thirteen “couples” participated (see table 1). Since we always invited
female and male students, two or more treatments were conducted at the same time in
each session. We conducted six separate sessions with 10 to 28 participants each. On
average, each session took about 50 minutes in total.
M-players obtained an average total payoff of AC7.39 (SD 1.46) including the show
up fee and the earnings from the two single lives. F-players obtained an average total
payoff of AC10.85 (SD 3.11).
5. Experimental Results
We now analyse the M-players’ decision in the fourth period of his eight “couple
lives”, the decision that is comparable to the decision in a standard dictator game. We
then complement this with insights from a post-experimental questionnaire.
First, however, let us extend the discussion we began at the end of section 2 and
explain why we need to focus our analysis on whether the M-players leave nothing
or two units, the number of periods that their F-partner lives longer, in period four
of their lives for their partner’s consumption in later periods. In period four, the M-
player’s consumption proposal, if it is implemented, determines the earnings for both
players in the following way: the M-player will earn
ΠM =
3∏
t=1
Ct × x4 with 0 ≤ x4 ≤ W4 = W1 −
3∑
t=1
Ct
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Figure 1: F-players’ earnings depend in a non-linearly way on the M-players’ consumption proposal x4
and the F-player will earn
ΠF =
3∏
t=1
Ct × x4 ×
(W4 − x4
2
)2
.
If the M-player leaves nothing, i.e. if x4 = W4, the F-player will earn nothing: ΠF =∏3
t=1 Ct ×W4 × 0. If the M-player leaves two units, i.e. if x4 = W4 − 2, both will earn
the same: ΠM =
∏3
t=1 Ct × (W4 − 2) =
∏3
t=1 Ct × (W4 − 2) × 1 = ΠF . This situation
is comparable to more standard dictator games. However, while M’s earnings increase
linearly with his consumption proposal x4, F’s earnings first increase and then decrease
with x4 (see figure 1 showing the factors by which
∏3
t=1 Ct is multiplied to yield the
earnings for M and F-players given a wealth of W4 = 6 in period 4).
Due to the stochastic implementation of consumption proposals, a given W4 does
not imply identical
∏3
t=1 Ct. It is also likely to observe different W4 in different lives
of the same couple and across different couples. Therefore, a given value of the M-
player’s consumption proposal in period four, x4, will lead to different earnings in dif-
ferent lives of the same couple and across different couples. The absolute values of the
M-players’ consumption proposals in period four cannot be meaningfully compared.
Given the implemented consumption proposals Ct in periods one to three, the sum
of the M-player’s and F-player’s earnings ΠM + ΠF of a couple is not constant, i.e. not
independent of the implemented consumption proposal in period four (see figure 1).
Further, due to the F-player’s non-linear payoff function the M-player’s consumption
proposal in period four does not lead to a linear transfer of earnings from M to F-
player. Therefore, also the M-players’ relative consumption proposals in period four
as a fraction of the remaining wealth W4 cannot be meaningfully compared.
Similar problems arise when looking at the amount left for the F-players’ consump-
tion in period five and six. However, (the likelihood of) M-players leaving nothing and
inducing zero earnings, and leaving two units and thus allowing the F-player to earn
the same payoff can be easily and meaningfully compared over different lives of a same
couple and across different couples. Hence, we focus the analysis on the occurrence of
these two events.
Before we begin with our analysis, let us note that while until the end of their
“single-lives” about a third of participants did not learn to perfectly smooth consump-
tion over their remaining time to live there is no gender bias in the ability to learn
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Figure 2: Few M-players are altruistic: Distribution of endowments at the beginning and less the M-players’
consumption proposal of period 4
consumption smoothing during the “single lives” (p = 0.21).
Observation 1. Compared to other studies, rather few M-players show altruistic be-
haviour towards their F-partner in the sense of not maximizing their own earnings by
consuming the total remaining wealth in the last period of their ‘life.’ Almost twice as
many participants than in the dictator game studies analysed by Engel (2011) leave
their partner with nothing.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of endowments at the beginning of period 4 over
all “couple lives” and treatments and the distribution of these endowments minus the
M-players’ consumption proposal. If participants were choosing only own payoff max-
imizing consumption choices we would expect the endowments to be in the range of
5.25 to 10.5. Indeed, more then 75% of endowments are in that range; only 62 endow-
ments are below and 34 endowments are above. Kolmogorov-Smirnov-tests show that
the distributions do not differ between the four treatments.
An indicator for whether participants care for each other would be whether any
endowment is left by M-players after the fourth period. In 247 out of 392 cases (63 %;
or 60 % if we consider only cases where the endowment was at least 5.25) an M-player
would not have left anything for his partner. This is considerably higher than the 36%
of participants not sharing their endowment reported in the meta-study of Engel (2011).
In less than 10% of all cases M-players would leave between zero and two units. In
13.5% they would leave exactly two units and in the remaining 13.5% they would leave
more than two units for their F-partner.
While we may consider this a successful reduction of the cognitive experimenter
demand effect a substantial amount of unselfish behaviour remains.
Observation 2. Independent of the M-player’s own gender a female F-player is treated
much kinder than a male F-player.
There are substantial differences considering the gender constellations as can be
seen in Figure 3. Corroborating the results of Engel (2011)’s meta study a male F-
player is left more often with nothing or with less than 2 units than a female F-player
independent of the M-players’ gender. While female M-players also leave amounts
between 0 and 2 (and more) units for their partner, male M-players either leave nothing
or 2 and more units in period 4.
A logistic regression on the relative number of times an M-player would leave less
than two units after period 4 shows that female F-players have a significantly lower
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M: male − F: male
M: female − F: male
M: male − F: female
M: female − F: female
relative frequency of leaving zero
and less than 2 units in period 4
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Figure 3: Female F-players get more: Frequencies of how often an M-player would consume the whole
endowment and how often he would leave less than 2 units of the endowment in period 4 in the four different
gender constellations
Table 2: The M-players’ consumption proposal depends only on the F-players’ gender: ANOVA for number
of times the M-players leaves less than two units in period four based on a multilevel logistic model
Factor Deviance Resid. Df Resid Dev. F P[> F]
maximal model 48 319.65
M-Gender 1.82 47 317.83 0.304 0.58
F-Gender 33.94 46 283.89 5.681 0.02
M-Gender:F-Gender 0.43 45 283.46 0.073 0.79
reduced model 48 319.65
F-Gender 33.42 47 286.23 5.786 0.02
probability of having an endowment of less than two units in period 5 (p = 0.02).
There are no significant differences with respect to the gender of the M-player, the
relevant dictator. Both female and male M-players are as likely to leave less than two
units for the F-player (p = 0.58). And, both female and male M-players show about
the same degree of discriminatory behaviour with respect to the F-player’s gender (p =
0.79). Thus, the favourable treatment of female F-players is not driven by M-players
of only one gender. The results of the correspondong ANOVA5 can be found in table
2. The model includes a factor for the gender of the M-player, a factor for the gender
of the F-player, and the interaction of these factors. Note, that we have to control for
overdispersion. This maximal model can be reduced by stepwise elimination of factors
that do not significantly contribute to the explanatory power. The minimal adequate
model contains only the factor for the F-player’s gender.
Analysing the relative number of times an M-player consumes the whole endow-
ment yields the same result: only the factor for the F-player’s gender is significant
(p = 0.02).
Based on a multilevel logistic regression in which we also include the available en-
dowment for each consumption decision we compute expected probabilities of leaving
at least two units in period 4. As can be seen in figure 4, corroborating the results of
Andreoni and Miller (2002), M-players are more likely to leave at least two units of
5While the model reported here has only one observation for each participant we also ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on all individual fourth period choices of the eight “couple lives” to test for “lives” effects
that may indicate any learning dynamics. We found none (F = 1.14, d f = 7, p = 0.34).
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Figure 4: The estimated probability for an M-player leaving at least two units in period 4 is increasing with
the endowment and is bigger if the F-player is female
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Figure 5: M-players are more altruistic towards female F-players independent of their own gender
endowment after period 4 when it is less costly for them, i.e. when there is relatively
more endowment left at the beginning of period 4. Of course, the more favourable
treatment of female F-players can also be seen here.
To provide a more complete description of the data we depict in figure 5 the mean
consumption proposals over all couple lives but separate for each couple as well as
implied endowments left for the F-player after period 4, the M-players’ end of life,
assuming future consumption proposals would equal the current one. Since the endow-
ment in each period t ≥ 2 is stochastic the raw consumption proposals are not easily
compared. We, therefore, plot the consumption proposals relative to the optimal con-
sumption proposal for an M-player with α = 0 according to equation 11. The overall
means of these values for each period are given in table 3. For better comparison of
the distribution of proposals between male and female M-players the plotted values are
sorted from low to high for each period.
The M-players’ consumption proposals are rather heterogeneous. We observe both
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Table 3: Average consumption proposals relatrive to the optimal proposal given α = 0
Gender of Player Period
M F 1 2 3 4
M-player male male 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.92
female male 0.98 1.03 1.02 0.89
male female 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.83
female female 1.13 1.10 1.00 0.83
F-player male male 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.05
male female 1.01 0.98 1.01 1.09
female male 0.98 0.90 0.94 0.93
female female 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.94
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Figure 6: There are no differences in the F-players’ consumption proposals with regard to their own gender
or the M-players’ gender
over- and under-consumption, implying a range of negative and positive α-values. The
distribution of consumption proposals for male and female M-players seems almost
identical. Indeed, separate Kruskal-Wallis tests for each period do not show any signif-
icant differences at the 5% level but for the fourth period supporting again our above
observation.
The overall lower mean value in table 3 for period 4 can be explained by the fact
that even spiteful, over-consuming M-players can not consume more than the available
endowment in period 4.
To complete the description of the data we depict in figure 6 the F-players’ mean
consumption proposals over all couple lives but separate for each couple. The plotted
values are constructed in the same way as above, using equation (8) to compute the
optimal proposal for α = 0. The overall means can also be found in table 3.
Again, we observe rather heterogeneous choices and under- and over-consumption,
implying negative and positive α-values. While table 3 seems to indicate that F-players
are nicer to male M-players independent of their own gender, i.e. F-players consume
relatively more when paired with a male M-player, separate Kruskal-Wallis tests for
each period do not indicate any statistically significant differences (p > 0.1).
Observation 3. The favourable treatment of female F-players seems not to be a result
of deliberate intentions; participants are not aware of their gender discrimination.
Are these gender discriminating choices reflected in our participants’ self-assess-
ment? With the help of a post-experimental questionnaire we derived a measure for
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subjective fairness attitude. Additionally, we asked whether females are fairer than
males, whether females are fairer towards other females than towards males (subjec-
tive female solidarity) and whether males are fairer towards other males than towards
females (subjective male solidarity). The questionnaire consisted of several statements
that were to be evaluated on a scale from one to six standing for completely wrong and
absolutely right. Some statements were repeatedly presented but each time rephrased
and put in a different way such that we get a more reliable measure in the aggregate.
Our measure for subjective fairness attitude reveals that females assess themselves
fairer than males assess themselves (Wilcoxon, p = 0.01).
This leads directly to the question whether females are also considered fairer than
males by our participants. This is negated considering the whole population (Wilcoxon,
p < 0.01).6 Whereby on average females themselves seem to be even more diffident
than males (Wilcoxon, p < 0.01) in evaluating who is the fairer gender.
Though not significant at the 5 % level, we want to present the quite revealing rank
correlation between subjective fairness attitude and the evaluation whether females are
fairer than males: corfemale = −0.29 (p = 0.05) and cormale = 0.10 (p = 0.48). As can
be seen, females with a higher subjective fairness attitude tend to negate the question
whether females are fairer than males. Whereas, males with a higher subjective fairness
attitude tend to affirm this question. Consequently, both genders seem to be rather
chary.
Eventually, both, males and females, negate the question whether females are fairer
towards their own gender than towards males (Wilcoxon, p < 0.01; female sub-sample
p < 0.01; male sub-sample p = 0.04); and they also agree to negate the question
whether males are fairer towards their own gender than towards females (Wilcoxon,
p < 0.01; female sub-sample p < 0.01; male sub-sample p < 0.01).
Finally, we asked our participants with whom they would like to repeat the exper-
iment, a female or a male. About two thirds of the participants are indifferent. The
remaining third stating some preferences for a female or male partner shows no signif-
icant inclination either.
These observations are supported by the following rather anecdotal evidence. After
the experiment some participants firmly rejected the possibility that there might be any
difference between the two genders. The most common reaction was the expressed
disbelieve in anyone conditioning his or her behaviour in the experiment on the gender
of his or her partner. A similar observation is reported by Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001) whose participants where entirely amazed after being debriefed by the fact that
they discriminated against one group without being aware of it.
To sum up, while the post-experimental individual self assessment reflects own be-
haviour during the experiment the assessment of the respective group behaviour does
only partly so. Although male rivalry and chivalry seem to be at least subconsciously
anticipated female solidarity is not. Thus, the observed behaviour, in particular the
general preferential treatment of females, seems not to be a result of mature and well
reasoned intentions. Participants are not fully aware of their own discriminating be-
haviour.
6We test whether the observed score of the measure is different from the neutral score, i.e. the mid-point
of the scale.
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6. Discussion
In this study we embedded a dictator game in a more complex decision environ-
ment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, to render the dictator decision
to share some endowment less salient what should reduce the cognitive experimenter
demand effect that would otherwise lead to an exaggerated level of observed altruism
(Bardsley, 2008; Zizzo, 2010). This in turn would strengthen the external validity of
our findings. We then used this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender
specific allocation behaviour and discrimination.
This non-deceptive obfuscation may, of course, also increase our participants’ po-
tentially existing confusion. However, we are not interested in our participants’ per-
formance in the consumption smoothing task that could be adversely affected by such
confusion. Systematic deviations from own earnings maximization and, in particular,
systematic differences in these deviations as we observed them are unlikely the result
of confusion and random error but rather the result of directed altruistic preferences
that our participants act on in spite of the non-salience of the distributional problem.
Extra noise that is caused by confusion may only make it harder to indicate statistically
significant differences in the systematic deviations from own earnings maximization.
Compared to a standard dictator game, we indeed observe a substantially lower
probability of sharing anything of the endowment indicating that we have successfully
reduced the potential cognitive experimenter demand effect. In general, rather few
M-players are ‘kind’ to their F-partner in the sense of leaving some endowment for
consumption after the fourth and last period of M’s life. On the other hand, being
‘kind’ depends on the gender of the F-partner. Independent of her partner’s gender a
female F-player is treated in a kinder way than a male F-player. This is in line with the
results of Engel (2011)’s meta study of dictator games – based on 39 articles reporting
on the existence or absence of gender effects out of a total of 131 analysed articles –
which showed that women tend to give more and tend to receive more (with the dictator
gender then being insignificant) than men.
Since this positive discrimination is independent of the decision makers’ own gen-
der it can not be driven by gender differences in cognitive abilities.
Further, the results of a post-experimental questionnaire indicate that this feature
of their behaviour is not anticipated by our participants. Thus, the observed behaviour
may be deduced from a rather instinctive female solidarity and men’s chivalry towards
the opposite gender.
It is interesting to note that this positive discrimination of females may compensate
the potential negative economic effect of their true longer life expectation outside the
laboratory and the implied gender bias in intra-couple intertemporal resource alloca-
tion. Moreover, partnerships outside the laboratory may last long enough to reinforce
the partnership specific affective social ties and thus to amplify the effect of the ob-
served positive discrimination.
From our experiment we conclude that indeed the behaviour of participants in ex-
periments depend on their partner. Surprisingly, men and women do not act very dif-
ferently since they both discriminate men and favour women. Yet, they are not aware
of this. When running experiments one should therefore take care that the composition
of a single session is not biased towards either gender. Otherwise the participants may
form beliefs that they will interact most probably with only one of the two genders and
thus may act differently. Further, since gender effects are only reported if significant
the evidence so far is somewhat ambiguous. To shed more light on whether or not there
really exists a robust gender difference in economic decision making one should always
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test for these differences and report the test results even if they indicate that there is no
significant difference.
AppendixA. Instructions (translation)
The following experiment consists of ten rounds. A round consists of several pe-
riods. In each round, money can be earned in a fictitious currency (points). On com-
pletion of the experiment the aggregate of all per-round earnings is paid out in cash,
based on the relationship of 8 points = AC0.01. You will also receive an additional
basic amount of AC2.50 for participating.
In principle, the task of a round is to distribute an initially available amount S of
21.00 points onto several periods.
For greater clarity, the amount that is spent by a participant in period one will be
referred to as x1, that of period two as x2, etc. Accordingly, you are required to spend
a certain amount xt in any experienced life period t. In the next period you will only
have the residual balance S − x1 − . . . − xt available for spending. A round’s earnings
are calculated as the product of all single amounts that were spent in each experienced
life period during this round. You should further note: When spending a zero-amount
in a period, you will earn nothing in that round (since one of the factors is zero in this
case).
There are two different types of participants:
- A-participants for whom a round consists of six periods. (their per-round earn-
ings G are calculated as: G = x1x2x3x4x5x6)
- B-participants for whom a round consists of the first four periods. (their per-
round earnings G are calculated as: G = x1x2x3x4)
Before round one begins, you will be told which type (A or B) you are and, hence, how
many periods you live per round.
In rounds one and two you make your decisions absolutely independently of other
participants’ decisions.
In round three and all subsequent rounds (up to round ten) you will be allotted to
some other participant. This other participant (allotted to you) will be of the other
type, i.e. if you are a type A participant with six periods to live, your allotted other
participant will only live four periods in that same round and vice versa. You remain
allotted to the same participant during all eight rounds. This participant can either be
female or male. Which gender the participant (allotted to you) has, you will be told at
the beginning of the third round.
Each pair of participants then decides for each period t simultaneously with, and
independently of, the other participant how much he/she wants to spend in a given
period. After both participants have made their decision, one of the two decisions is
drawn by lot. This drawn-by-lot decision will be valid for both participants, i.e. it
becomes the amount of spending xt for that particular period t and for both participants
(A and B). The amount is deducted from the residual budget of the two participants.
For the first four periods of every round, decisions are determined in this manner. In
periods five and six, the participant who lives through six periods, can make his/her
autonomous decisions again. Per-round earnings are calculated for both participants as
described above. During the entire experiment, a button in the lower left screen corner
is available for access to a pocket computer.
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Your entries will remain anonymous because we are only able to assign any of your
data to your code number – not to your person. If you have any questions concerning
the experiment, please, raise your hand. We will then try to answer your questions
privately. Please do not speak with your neighbours since any exchange of information
will render your data useless for our purposes. In that case we will have to exclude you
from the experiment and refrain from paying you any money.
AppendixB. Questionnaire (translation)
All statements of the questionnaire except for the first were answered on a six point
scale raging from completely wrong to completely right.
• If you were to repeat this experiment with whom would you prefer to interact?
Options: with a man, with a woman, I do not care
• Women are fairer towards women than towards men.
• The experiment was unfair.
• I did not understand what I was supposed to do.
• Men are fairer towards men than towards women.
• Men are more egoistic than women.
• I had barely influence on my earnings.
• I am satisfied with my decisions in this experiment.
• I felt treated fair in this experiment.
• Women are fairer than men.
• In this experiment I was especially fair.
• All should get the same amount of money just for participating and regardless of
their performance in this experiment.
• The main point is I earned a lot.
• I do not care for the earnings of other participants.
• My decisions in this experiment were easy.
• My partner in this experiment is simpatico.
AppendixC. Constructive Derivation of Benchmark Solution
We prove (i) that the parameter α describing the weight of the partner’s earnings
in one’s own utility function determines together with the remaining time to live how
much of the total wealth should be consumed during the joint life time of both, M and
F-players, and how much should be left for the remaining periods of the F-players
longer life, and (ii) that conditional consumption smoothing in the sense of consuming
that amount which results from spreading the so determined available funds equally
over one’s own remaining joint life time is optimal for both players at any t ≤ m and
for the remaining periods of the F-player’s longer life after t = m.
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AppendixC.1. The F-Players Optimal Consumption Proposals
First, let uF(W,C) denote the log utility of F and E[·] the expectation operator then
E[uF(W,C)] =
f∑
t=0
E[ f (Ct, t)] + α
m∑
t=0
E[ f (Ct, t)] with f (Ct, t) = logCt,
(C.1)
where Ct is an element of the set of feasible consumption decisions Γt, i.e. Ct ∈ Γt =
{0 ≤ Ct ≤ Wt}. Ct is randomly dictated by player M or F. With xt and yt denoting the
consumption proposal of M and F respectively we get
E[ f (Ct(xt, yt), t)] =
 12 log xt + 12 log yt for t ≤ mlog yt for m < t ≤ f (C.2)
and
E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yt), t)] =
Wt −
(
1
2 xt +
1
2yt
)
= E[Wt+1] for t ≤ m
Wt − yt = E[Wt+1] for m < t ≤ f
(C.3)
defining the expected transition of wealth from period t to t + 1. Assuming a program,
y, that maximizes the above expected utility, we can define the following value function
at time t as:
V?(Wt, t) = max
yt=(yt ,...,y f )
(1 + α)
m∑
τ=t
E[ f (Cτ(xτ, yτ), τ)] +
f∑
τ=m+1
E[ f (Cτ(xτ, yτ), τ)]
(C.4)
Assume we know that V?(Wt+1, t + 1) = V(Wt+1, t + 1) and that yt? = (y?t , . . . , y
?
m) is
the program that maximizes (C.4). By the Principle of Optimality we know that if the
optimal decision today is yt? = (y?t , . . . , y
?
f ), then the sequence y
t+1? = (y?t+1, . . . , y
?
f )
will be optimal starting tomorrow. Thus, we can write:
V?(Wt, t) = (1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)] + V
?(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)], t + 1)
= (1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)] + V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)], t + 1) for t ≤ m
and (C.5)
V?(Wt, t) = E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)] + V
?(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)], t + 1)
= E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)] + V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)], t + 1) for t > m
If there was a yˆt ∈ Γt such that
(1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, yˆt), t)] + V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt), t)], t + 1) >
(1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)] + V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)], t + 1) (C.6)
then there would be a program yˆt that would result in a higher value for V? than yt?,
where yˆt+1 is the program that maximizes
V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt), t)], t + 1) = V?(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yˆt), t)], t + 1). (C.7)
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The existence of such a program, however, would contradict the optimality of yt?.
Therefore there cannot be such a yˆt and thus:
V?(Wt, t) =

maxyt∈Γt (1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, yt), t)]+
V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yt), t)], t + 1) for t ≤ m
maxyt∈Γt E[ f (Ct(xt, yt), t)]+
V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yt), t)], t + 1) for t > m
(C.8)
that leads to V?(Wt, t) = V(Wt, t).
By the first order condition for yt we have for all W and t ≤ m at the optimum:
(1 + α)
∂E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂yt
+
∂V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)], t + 1)
∂E[T ]
× ∂E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)]
∂yt
= 0. (C.9)
For t > m we obtain the same equation without the factor 1 + α. We substitute (C.9)
for ∂V/∂E[T ] into
∂V(Wt, t)
∂Wt
=
∂E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂Wt
+
∂V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)], t + 1)
∂E[T ]
× ∂E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)]
∂Wt
(C.10)
and get for t ≤ m
∂V(Wt, t)
∂Wt
=
∂E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂Wt
− (1 + α)∂E[ f (Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)]
∂yt
∂E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂Wt
∂E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂yt
. (C.11)
The Euler equation can then be derived with the help of ∂V/∂Wt+1:
(1 + α)
∂E[ f (Ct(xt, y?t ), t)]
∂yt
+
(
∂E[ f (Ct+1(xt, y?t ), t + 1)]
∂Wt+1
−(1 + α)∂E[ f (Ct+1(xt+1, y
?
t+1), t + 1)]
∂yt+1
×
∂E[T (Wt+1,Ct+1(xt+1, y?t+1), t + 1)]
∂Wt+1
∂E[T (Wt+1,Ct+1(xt+1, y?t+1), t + 1)]
∂yt+1

×∂E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, y
?
t ), t)]
∂yt
= 0.
(C.12)
We can now solve for the optimal consumption proposal of player F. The Euler equa-
18
tion reduces finally to
1 + α
2y?t
+
(
0 +
1 + α
y?t+1
) (
−1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ y?t = y?t+1 for t < m
and (C.13)
1
2y?t
+
(
0 +
1
y?t+1
) (
−1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ y?t = y?t+1 for t > m
It immediately follows that for t > m player F will spread the available wealth equally
over the remaining periods
y?t =
Wt
f − t + 1 =
Wm+1
f − m for t > m (C.14)
At t = m the value function V that player F tries to maximize can hence also be written
as
V(Wm,m) =(1 + α)
(
0.5 log xm + 0.5 log ym
)
+
(
0.5( f − m) log Wm − xm
f − m + 0.5( f − m) log
Wm − ym
f − m
)
(C.15)
Therefore follows
∂V(Wm,m)
∂ym
= 0.5
1 + α
y?m
− 0.5 ( f − m)
Wm − y?m = 0 (C.16)
y?m =
(1 + α)Wm
α + f − m + 1 . (C.17)
Using equation (C.13) allows us then to conclude that the optimal feasible con-
sumption proposal y?t ∈ Γt of player F is
y?t =
(1 + α)Wt
α(m − t + 1) + f − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m. (C.18)
At any time the choice of the optimal consumption proposal y?t does not depend on
present or future choices of M’s consumption proposal xt+i ∀ i ≥ 0 but only on present
available funds Wt, the own remaining time to live f − t + 1, and until period t = m the
parameter α and the M-player’s remaining time to live m − t + 1.
AppendixC.2. The M-Players Optimal Consumption Proposals
The M-player’s optimal consumption proposals can be derived in an analogous
manner. In the following we therefore only sketch this derivation.
First, while keeping the above definitions let uM(W,C) denote the log utility of M
then
E[uM(W,C)] =
m∑
t=0
E[ f (Ct, t)] + α
f∑
t=0
E[ f (Ct, t)] with f (Ct, t) = logCt,
(C.19)
Assuming a program, x, that maximizes the above expected utility, we can define the
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following value function at time t as:
V?(Wt, t) = max
xt=(xt ,...,xm)
(1 + α)
m∑
τ=t
E[ f (Cτ(xτ, yτ), τ)] + α
f∑
τ=m+1
E[ f (Cτ(xτ, yτ), τ)]
(C.20)
and analogous to the above proof for player F we obtain
V?(Wt, t) = max
xt∈Γt
[
(1 + α)E[ f (Ct(xt, yt), t)] + V(E[T (Wt,Ct(xt, yt), t)], t + 1)
]
(C.21)
that leads to V?(Wt, t) = V(Wt, t) and eventually to the Euler equation
(1 + α)
∂E[ f (Ct(x?t , yt), t)]
∂xt
+
(
∂E[ f (Ct+1(x?t , yt), t + 1)]
∂Wt+1
−(1 + α)∂E[ f (Ct+1(x
?
t+1, yt+1), t + 1)]
∂xt+1
×
∂E[T (Wt+1,Ct+1(x?t+1, yt+1), t + 1)]
∂Wt+1
∂E[T (Wt+1,Ct+1(x?t+1, yt+1), t + 1)]
∂xt+1

×∂E[T (Wt,Ct(x
?
t , yt), t)]
∂xt
= 0.
(C.22)
This Euler equation reduces to
1 + α
2x?t
+
(
0 +
1 + α
x?t+1
) (
−1
2
)
= 0 ⇒ x?t = x?t+1 for t < m (C.23)
At t = m the value function V that player M tries to maximize can be written as
V(Wm,m) =(1 + α)
(
0.5 log xm + 0.5 log yt
)
+ α
(
0.5( f − m) log Wm − xm
f − m + 0.5( f − m) log
Wm − ym
f − m
)
(C.24)
what makes use of the F-players optimal consumption in periods t > m described in
equation (C.14). Therefore follows
∂V(Wm,m)
∂xm
= 0.5
1 + α
x?m
+ 0.5
(1 + α)( f − m)
x?m −Wm = 0 (C.25)
x?m =
(1 + α)Wm
α( f − m + 1) + 1 . (C.26)
Using equation (C.23) allows us then to conclude that the optimal feasible con-
sumption proposal x?t ∈ Γt of player M is
x?t =
(1 + α)Wt
α( f − t + 1) + m − t + 1 ∀ t ≤ m. (C.27)
At any time the choice of the optimal consumption proposal x?t does not depend on
present or future choices of F’s consumption proposal yt+i ∀ i ≥ 0 but only on present
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available funds Wt, the own remaining time to live m − t + 1, and parameter α and F’s
remaining time to live f − t + 1 if α , 0.
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